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Abstract 
This thesis examines what factors that affect the capital structure of 84 listed real estate firms 
within the European Union for ten years during 2003-2012. To identify factors that affect capital 
structure a literature review is conducted to be able to analyse the regressions of the quantitative 
method. The dependent variable is leverage and the independent variables are size, return on 
equity, price-to-sales ratio, return, risk and one dummy variable for Real Estate Investment Trusts 
(REITs) and ten dummy variables for ten years. The theories from Modigliani and Miller, the 
trade off and the pecking order are presented and analysed along with the result from regressions 
in order to identify whether the variables affect the capital structure as foreseen by the theories. 
The sample is divided in REITs and Real Estate Operating Companies (REOCs) to be able to 
conduct the regressions. The result shows that return on equity (ROE) has a negative effect on 
leverage, price to sales ratio (PSR) has a negative effect on leverage and that risk has a positive 
effect on leverage for REITs. The variables; return on equity, price to sales ratio and risk are 
statistically significant. Hence, the expected outcome is as predicted and in line with the trade off 
model and the pecking order theory. The result for REOCs shows that PSR is significant. One of 
the models for REOCs suggests that leverage has decreased from the base year of 2003.
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1. Introduction	  
Capital structure refers to the relative proportion of equity and debt in the real estate investment 
(Miller & Geltner, 2005). Unlike other risks, such as systematic risk, the risk induced by leverage 
is one that an investor can control. The use of debt is commonly used within the real estate sector 
and real estates are famous as a source of collateral for major amounts of debt.  
 
This thesis deals with factors that affect the capital structure of listed European real estate 
companies. Many factors need to be taken into account when establishing a company’s capital 
structure (Titman & Wessels, 1988). Generally, firms that exhibit stable and high sales tend to 
utilize financial leverage more compared to firms with greater volatility of sales. Firms in the real 
estate sector do have stable and predicted income since the primarily income is rents. 
Consequently, real estate firms tend to experience higher leverage ratio compared to other 
sectors. Owusu-Ansah (2009) showed that real estate firms tend to have higher level of debt-to-
total assets compared to firms in the IT and health care sector within Sweden. 
 
A series of factors have been determined also called independent variables. Regression analysis 
on leverage has been accomplished in order to determine the importance of the variable of the 
choice between debt and equity. This report relies on market information such as profitability and 
stock price rather than balance sheet, income and financial statements. Hence, the firms included 
will be comparable which might not have been the case otherwise due to country-specific bias 
concerning law and fiscal policies. The sample is internationally relevant and the data constitutes 
of 84 firms. The	  index	  includes	  both	  Real	  Estate	  Operating	  Companies	  (REOC)	  and	  Real	  Estate	  Investment	  Trusts	  (REIT)	  (EPRA, 2014).	  The	  degradation	  between	  REOC	  and	  REIT	  allows	  considering	  the	  capital	  structure	  for	  both	  cases.	  This	  is	  relevant	  because	  REITs	  are	  tax-­‐exempt	  and	  will	  therefor	  result	  in	  different	  debt-­‐to-­‐total	  asset	  ratio	  or	  leverage.	  Morri 
and Cristanziani (2009) argue that REIT firms are less leverage than non-REIT firms. They claim 
it depends on the importance of tax-exempt in the choice of capital structure. However, the tax-
exempt will not specifically be analysed in this report.  
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1.1 Background	  
The real estate industry is different to several other industries. Due to the great deal of collateral 
that supports high level of debt, companies within the real estate industry have generally high 
level of leverage. Since real estate is a capital-intensive business, investments within this area for 
purchase of land and construction require major capital from external funds. Myers (2001) argues 
that a company is funded either of equity or debt, or both. Equity is stockholders invested capital 
and debt is bank loan, bonds and founding from credit institution etcetera. Equal for all debt is 
that a fee has to be paid as an interest rate. Due to the indebtness of real estate firms there is 
strong relation to the capital markets.    
 
In 1958 Modigliani and Miller introduced their theoretical model in corporate finance 
(Modigliani & Miller, 1958). The model explained that in a capital markets free of taxes, free of 
transaction costs and free of other frictions, the market valuation should not be affected by the 
capital structure. Modigliani and Miller’s model assumes that there are no taxes, which of course 
is not appropriate in the real world where almost every, if not all, company are paying taxes. 
Thus, Modigliani and Miller (1963) present a revised model that takes taxes in too consideration. 
Further, the trade-off theory seems to be more relevant. According to the trade-off theory, the 
optimal capital structure ratio is reach when tax advantages to borrow are balanced (Myers, 
1984). 
 
Nevertheless, there are several theories that try to explain the optimal capital structure. The 
question still remains; is there a perfect approach to reach optimal capital structure or does it 
change over time? This paper examines which factors affect capital structure in numerous of 
companies in the real estate industry. In order to accomplish the study, Morri and Cristanziani´s 
(2009) paper “What determine the capital structure of real estate?” has been used as a source of 
inspiration. Morri and Cristanziani (2009) analyse 37 real estate investment trust and 60 regular 
real estate companies of the European Public Real Estate Association (EPRA) NAREIT Europe 
Index. Their regression is conducted of seven independent variables; size, profitability, growth 
opportunities, cost of debt, ownership structure, risk and category. Morri and Cristanziani (2009) 
have used panel data set over a five years period. To be able to conduct a proper analysis a lot of 
inspiration has been conducted from Morri and Cristanziani (2009).  
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1.2 Purpose	  
The objective for this thesis is to investigate what factors that affect the capital structure of 84 
listed real estate firms within the FTSE EPRA/NAREIT Europe index.   
1.3 Sample	  selection	  
The FTSE EPRA/NAREIT Europe index from 2012 have been used to select companies, also 
called constituent name. These constituents are listed in Belgium, Czech Republic, Finland, 
France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Austria, Poland, Russia, Sweden, Switzerland, 
Turkey, and the UK. Some firms and countries have been excluded due to missing values or lack 
of data. The excluded countries are Czech Republic and Greece. Whereas 12 firms have been 
excluded in total. The index includes both REOCs and REITs. See appendix for firms included in 
the FTSE EPRA/NAREIT Europe index and the excluded firms.  
 
The regression will be based from a data set during the time period of 2003-12-31 and 2012-12-
31. The data will include the dependent variable leverage and independent variables such as size, 
return on equity, price to sales ratio, stock return and risk.  
1.4 Research	  question	  
The following is this thesis reserach questions: 
• What	  factors	  affect	  the	  capital	  structure	  the	  most?	  	  
• Over	  time,	  is	  there	  a	  significant	  change	  of	  the	  capital	  structure	  within	  real	  estate	  firms?	  	  
1.5 Outline	  of	  thesis	  
The thesis consists of 7 chapters. The initial chapter of this study is aimed to introduce the reader 
to the research that has been conducted. Chapter 1 covers the background, purpose and research 
questions. Further on, the theoretical background will be presented in chapter 2 and the method 
will be examined in chapter 3. The result will be presented in chapter 4, followed by the analysis 
in chapter 5. Finally the discussion will be drawn in chapter 6 and conclusion in chapter 7.   
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2. Theory	  
This section concerns previous studies regarding the subject. Moreover, several relevant theories 
about capital structure will be presented.  
2.1 Previous	  studies	  
Morri and Cristanziani (2009) investigate what affecting the choice the capital structure of real 
estate companies. Their paper consists of an analysis of companies belonging to the 
EPRA/NAREIT Europe Index. The seven independent variables that were used in the regression 
were size, probability, growth opportunities, cost of debt, ownership structure, risk and category. 
The study was combined during a 5 years period. In the result Morri and Cristanziani (2009) 
argue that REIT firms are less leverage than non-REIT firms. They claim it depends on the 
importance of tax-exempt in the choice of capital structure. Moreover, results regarding the 
relationship between operating risk and leverage show that there is a negative relationship. The 
negative relationship implies that manager of riskier companies manage to decrease the total 
uncertainty of the firm by approach a less risky capital structure. Findings also submit that the 
size of a firm’s assets effect the level of debt, which implies that debt is less expensive for larger 
firms. Further, conclusion also shows that more profitable companies have less recourse to 
leverage (Morri & Cristanziani, 2009). 
 
Owusu-Ansah (2009) shows that real estate firms tend to have higher level of leverage compare 
to firms in the IT and health care sector within Sweden. Real estate is a capital-intensive industry 
due to expensive investments that have to be done to become a property owner. The trade off 
theory claim that greater collateral support higher levels of debt. Since the real estate industry 
have high collateral within the properties the higher ratio of debt is adequate. Other sectors that 
do not have that level of collateral also tend to have a lower level of debt. Firms with equity are 
able to adjust their capital structure by increase their level of debt. Indeed, new debt will adjust 
the tax shield. An increase in debt will probably increase bankruptcy costs as well.  However, 
Morri and Cristianziani (2009) show that their results consist according to Pecking order theory 
and trade off theory. Bond and Scott (2006) also confirm information asymmetries drive firm 
choice of financing, which endorse Pecking order theory. Fama and French (2002) argue that the 
average leverage is decreasing even though the change is gradual and slow. Ozkan (2001) also 
argue that firm have target for the leverage but adapt debt objective quickly to have the optimal 
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structure during that time period. Leary and Roberts (2005) argues, like Ozkan (2001), that firms 
adjust their capital structure to be able to stay in the estimated optimal leverage ratio. 
Furthermore, Auerbach (1985), Opler and Titman (1994), Marsh (1982) and Taggart (1977) in 
one way or another confim Ozkan (2001) statement that finding an optimal leverage is an endless 
assignment. Feng, Ghosh and Sirmans (2007) argue that the pecking order theory explain the 
capital structure better for REIT firms where the cost of asymmetric information is greater than 
the cost of financial distress.   
2.2 Theoretical	  framework	  of	  capital	  structure	  
The most relevant theories for the thesis and purpose will be presented in this chapter.  
2.2.1 The	  Modigliani-­‐Miller	  Theorem	  
Modigliani and Miller (1958) model shows the capital structure of debt and equity does not affect 
the value of a firm. They are assuming that a firm has a certain amount of expected cash flow. 
The firm then choose a ratio of debt and equity. Modigliani and Miller (1958) argue that all it 
does is to divide the cash flow amongst the shareholders. To make this hold there are several 
assumption that has to be fulfilled.  
 
• Capital markets are frictionless, which implies that assets can be purchased and sold 
without any cost and instantly.       
• It is possible to lend and borrow at the risk-free rate. 
• There are no costs to bankruptcy.  
• Corporations are operating in the same class of risk.  
• Corporate and personal income tax does not exist. 
• Cash flow is forever and there is no growth. 
• Same information for corporate insiders and public is available.  
• Agency cost does not exist and manager always maximise shareholders wealth. 
 
Modigliani and Miller without taxes  
If the assumptions are satisfied the equation 𝑉! = 𝑉! holds (Equation 1). Where  𝑉! is the value of the leverage firm. 𝑉! is the value of the unleveraged firm. This is the first 
proposition of two. The second can be derive from the formula from Weighted average cost of 
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capital and look as follows; 𝑅!= 𝑅! + !! (𝑅! − 𝑅!) (Equation 2). Where 𝑅! is return on equity. D 
is debt. E is equity. 𝑅! is return on debt (Modigliani & Miller, 1958). 
Proposition 1 (Equation 1) explains that the choice of capital structure does not effect the market 
value of the firm. Proposition 2 (Equation 2) claims that excepted return of equity increase 
proportionate to an increase in level of leverage.  
 
Modigliani and Miller with taxes  
The Modigliani and Miller theorem without taxes faced a lot of critic for the allegation that taxes 
do not affect the capital structure. In 1963 Modigliani and Miller present a new theorem in the 
paper “Corporate Income Taxes and the Cost of Capital: A correction”. 
This approach includes tax affect in the choice of capital structure. Thus, the value of a leverage 
firm is equal to the value of an unleveraged firm plus the present value of a taxes shield. 𝑉! = 𝑉! + 𝑇! ∗ 𝐷 (Equation 3). Where 𝑇!  is the tax rate and equation 3 is termed as proposition 
1. Tax shield is the value of the tax reduction that achieves from tax deduction.  
The second proposition is 𝑅! = 𝑟! + !! (1− 𝑇!)(𝑟! − 𝑟!) (Equation 4) where 𝑟! is the firms cost 
of equity if the firm is not leverage and 𝑟! is the required rate of return on debt.  
 
Proposition 1 (Equation 3) implies that a tax reduction gives the leverage firm a greater value 
than a non leverage firm since a larger proportion of the profit is left over and divided among the 
shareholders and lenders. Proposition 2 (Equation 4) shows that the weighted average cost of 
capital is no longer constant. This is explained by the value of the tax shield increase as the firm 
increase their leverage, which lower the cost of the debt and thus also the company’s weighted 
average cost of capital.    
2.2.2 The	  Trade-­‐off	  theory	  
Based on the Modigliani and Miller theory of capital structure, Kraus and Litzenberger (1973) 
designed the trade off theory. The trade off theory implies that the optimal leverage gives a trade-
off between tax benefits of debt and the deadweight costs of bankruptcy. Myers (1984) argues 
that a firm, which follow the trade-off theory, set a target for the debt and then tries to achieve 
their ambition by slowly change the ratio towards the target. The trade-off theory indicates that 
there is a theoretical optimal capital structure for each firm when taxes, expenses and financial 
distress are taken into account. Further, the model describes how a firm can maximize their 
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market value by use the tax advantages from debt to be able to reach optimal capital structure. 
Increasing debt results in increased value of the tax shield, which raise the market value of the 
firm (Morri & Cristanziani, 2009). Figure 1 describes the relationship between the firm value and 
debt/equity-ratio. The two lines illustrates different set up of the debt/equity-ratio and hence the 
cost financial distress. As the debt/equity-ratio increases there is a trade-off between the tax 
shield and bankruptcy costs. The line of a levered firm can be compared to the perpendicular line 
of an unlevered firm. At the peak of the curve the optimal debt/equity-ratio is shown.  
 
Figure 1 – The Trade-off theory of capital structure. Inspired by (Miller, 1977). 
 
Further, Breadly, Jarrell and Kim (1984) argue that increased debt will increase the risk for 
bankruptcy. The optimal level of capital structure is then find by identifying the balance between 
financial distress and debt. In other words, increased debt may be good to a certain level. 
However, if bankruptcy costs seems to be to high in comparison to the tax advantages the 
advantages disappear. Further, the trade-off theory states that the optimal capital structure is 
different for every firm.  
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2.2.3 The	  Pecking	  order	  theory	  
The pecking order theory is an old existing theory that has been modified by Myers (1984). The 
theory states the order of which way a firm choose to bring new capital for investments. 
Assumption to fulfil the theory is a perfect capital market with exception for asymmetric 
information between managers and investors. Managers are supposed to have more information 
regarding the firm value, profile of risk and future prospect. Managers strive to shape the capital 
structure to minimize expenses for shareholders (Morri & Cristanziani, 2009). Therefore 
management of firms use the less risky alternative to fund investments (Myers, 1984). Hence, the 
order of fund investment is: 
1. Internal financing 
2. Issue new debt  
3. Issue new equity  
 
According to Myers and Majluf (1984) the pecking order theory also include dividend policy and 
argue that it is “sticky”, meaning that firms almost always tries to retain a constant dividend. This 
is done to keep the share price stable over a period with variation in the current profits.  
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3. Methodology	  
In this chapter, the research strategy for this investigation is presented. In addition to the 
quantitative method a literature review was conducted within the framework of the paper’s 
purpose. The aim for the literature review was primarily to understand the subject and 
secondarily to get a theoretical basis to be able to analyse and interpret collected data and result 
from the regression.  
 
The analysis is conducted by using unbalanced panel data linear regression. The dependent 
variable is leverage during the time period of 2003-12-31 and 2013-12-31. By using panel data it 
allows to consider if the variables affecting the capital structure are the same in the early 21th 
century as ten years later. The regressions and tests performed will be explained more in detail in 
chapter 3.2.  
3.1 Determinants	  of	  capital	  structure	  
This section presents the framework of the key variables that affect the leverage or the debt-to-
total asset ratio. In other studies, such as Titman and Wessel (1988), they included variables such 
as asset structure, non-debt tax shields, growth, uniqueness, industry classification, size, earnings 
volatility and profitability. Morri and Cristanziani (2009) included size, profitability, growth, cost 
of debt and operating risk. The following variables have been chosen in this thesis; leverage, size, 
return on equity (ROE), price-to-sales ratio (PSR), return, risk and one dummy variable for REIT 
and 10 dummy variables for years. 
 
All data used to conduct the various variables have been collected through the Bloomberg 
database. In some cases, certain variables how been adjusted to fit what was offered by the 
Bloomberg database. This is for example the case for the variable “Return on Common Equity” 
(ROE), which was chosen instead of return on equity.  
 
Each independent variable will be tested for significance solely in order to easier analysis the 
significance of the model. Variables that present statistical significance will then be run in a 
multiple regression test. The model below includes 16 independent variables where 11 of them 
are dummy variables depending on year and if the firm is a REIT or not. The dummy variable for 
year 2003 (𝐷!""#) is the benchmark year. Hence, it will be excluded in the regression.  
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 𝐿𝐸𝑉𝐸𝑅𝐴𝐺𝐸!,! = α+   𝛽! ∗ 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒! + 𝛽! ∗ 𝑅𝑂𝐸! +     𝛽! ∗ 𝑃𝑆𝑅! +   𝛽! ∗ 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛! +   𝛽! ∗ 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘! + 𝛽!∗ 𝑅𝑒𝑖𝑡! + 𝛽! ∗ 𝐷!""# + 𝛽! ∗ 𝐷!""# + 𝛽! ∗ 𝐷!""# + 𝛽!" ∗ 𝐷!""# + 𝛽!! ∗ 𝐷!""#+ 𝛽!! ∗ 𝐷!""# + 𝛽!" ∗ 𝐷!""# + 𝛽!" ∗ 𝐷!"#" + 𝛽!" ∗ 𝐷!"## + 𝛽!" ∗ 𝐷!"#! + 𝑒!,! 
 
Leverage 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒!,! = 𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑡  𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚  𝑏𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑔!,! + 𝐿𝑜𝑛𝑔  𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚  𝑏𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑔!,!𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙  𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠!,!  
 
Leverage represents the capital structure of a firm. Leverage is measured in percentage.  
 
Size 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒! = ln  (𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙  𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠) 
 
Firm size can be measured by many figures e.g. the amount of total assets, the number of people 
employed and the amount of sales. However, since real estate firms are considered the number of 
people employed would not be relevant. Therefor the proxy of firm size is given by the natural 
logarithm of total asset reported on the balance sheet. Previous studies, such as Rajan and 
Zingales (1995) and Morri and Cristanziani (2009) argue for a positive effect on leverage. The 
variable total asset is transformed into log-form.  
 
Return on common equity (ROE) 𝑅𝑂𝐸!,! = 𝑁𝑒𝑡  𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒  𝑎𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑒  𝑓𝑜𝑟  𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑛  𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑒𝑟𝑠!,!𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒  𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙  𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑛  𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦!,!  
 
Return on Common Equity measures of a firm’s profitability by revealing how much profit a 
company generates with the money shareholders have invested. Return on Common Equity is 
measured in percentage. Profitability and leverage are uncorrelated according to Huang and Song 
(2006). Hence, profitable firms tend to exhibit lower leverage. 
 
Price to sales ratio (PSR) 
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𝑃𝑆𝑅!,! = 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒  𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒!,!𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠  𝑝𝑒𝑟  𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒!,! 
The price to sales ratio compares a firm’s stock price to its revenues or sales. This ratio is 
relevant when comparing firms within the same sector. The lower ratio the better investment 
since the investor is paying less for each unit of sales.  
 
Stock Return (Ret) 𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘  𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛!,! = 𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘  𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒!,!!! − 𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘  𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒!,!𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘  𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒!,! ∗ 100 
 
I order to analyse Stock return annual, it is calculated from the last trading day of the year 
available. Return is measured in percentage. The debt ratio dynamics can be explained by 40 
percent of the stock return over one- to five-year horizons (Welch, 2004). 
 
Risk 
𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘!,! = (𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑙𝑦  𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘  𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛!,! − 𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒  𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑙𝑦  𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘  𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛!,!)!!,! 12  
 
Many authors argue that a firm’s optimal debt level is a decreasing function of volatility of the 
earnings (Titman & Wessels, 1988). Hence, increased leverage result in increased risk. Due to 
homogenous capital structure, operating risk for firms within the same industry are generally the 
same (Bradley, Jarrell, & Kim, 1984). The Risk variable will consider the volatility, i.e. the 
standard deviation of the stocks. Risk is measured in percentage. 
 
REITs and Year dummies 
 
REIT is a dummy variable to explain whether a firm is a Real Estate Investments Trust or a 
regular real estate firm. If it is a REIT the dummy takes the value 1 and if it is not a REIT the 
dummy takes the value 0. REITs were established in the US and approved by the Congress in 
1960 (Dawson, 1961). REITs are tax-exempt and will therefor result in different debt-to-total 
asset ratio or leverage. Morri and Cristanziani (2009) argue that REIT firms are less leverage than 
non-REIT firms. Therefore, REIT is expected to affect leverage negative.  
12 
 
 
Each year of collected data has a dummy variable to represent that specific year. The year 
dummy takes the value 1 if it represents the current year and 0 if it is another year.  
 
3.2 Hypothesis	  	   	  
In order to test if 𝛽! of each independent variable are statistically significant on leverage a 
hypothesis test was conducted for each 𝛽! (Wooldridge , 2013). The hypothesis was stated as  𝐻! = 𝛽! 𝐻! ≠ 𝛽! 
If it is possible to reject the null hypothesis (𝐻!) then the 𝛽! has a significant impact on the 
dependent variable. If it is not possible to reject the null hypothesis the independent variable can 
still have an impact on the dependent variable but it is not possible to prove that is the case.  
 
Since, it is not possible to be 100 % sure if the null hypothesis is true or not two errors can be 
made. The first is a Type 1 error. It is done when one rejects the null hypothesis and the null 
hypothesis is true. The second error is a Type 2 error. It is made when one fails to reject the null 
hypothesis and the null hypothesis is wrong.  The probability of making a Type 1 error is the 
statistically significance that is selected by the researcher.  
 
Below are the hypotheses presented: 
 
Size (total assets) 𝐻!!"#$ = 𝑇ℎ𝑒  𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒  𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒  𝑑𝑜𝑒𝑠  𝑛𝑜𝑡  𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡  𝑡ℎ𝑒  𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒  𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒   𝐻!!"#$ = 𝑇ℎ𝑒  𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒  𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒  𝑑𝑜𝑒𝑠  𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡  𝑡ℎ𝑒  𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒  𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒   
 
Return on common equity (ROE) 𝐻!!"# = 𝑇ℎ𝑒  𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒  𝑅𝑂𝐸  𝑑𝑜𝑒𝑠  𝑛𝑜𝑡  𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡  𝑡ℎ𝑒  𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒  𝑛𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒   𝐻!!"# = 𝑇ℎ𝑒  𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒  𝑅𝑂𝐸  𝑑𝑜𝑒𝑠  𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡  𝑡ℎ𝑒  𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒  𝑛𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 
 
Price to sales ratio (PSR) 𝐻!!"# = 𝑇ℎ𝑒  𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒  𝑃𝑆𝑅  𝑑𝑜𝑒𝑠  𝑛𝑜𝑡  𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡  𝑡ℎ𝑒  𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒  𝑛𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 
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𝐻!!"# = 𝑇ℎ𝑒  𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒  𝑃𝑆𝑇  𝑑𝑜𝑒𝑠  𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡  𝑡ℎ𝑒  𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒  𝑛𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 
 
Stock Return (Ret) 𝐻!!"# = 𝑇ℎ𝑒  𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒  𝑅𝐸𝑇  𝑑𝑜𝑒𝑠  𝑛𝑜𝑡  𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡  𝑡ℎ𝑒  𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒  𝑛𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝐻!!"# = 𝑇ℎ𝑒  𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒  𝑅𝑂𝐸  𝑑𝑜𝑒𝑠  𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡  𝑡ℎ𝑒  𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒  𝑛𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 
 
Risk 𝐻!!"#$ = 𝑇ℎ𝑒  𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒  𝑅𝐸𝑇  𝑑𝑜𝑒𝑠  𝑛𝑜𝑡  𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡  𝑡ℎ𝑒  𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒  𝑛𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝐻!!"#$ = 𝑇ℎ𝑒  𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒  𝑅𝐸𝑇  𝑑𝑜𝑒𝑠  𝑛𝑜𝑡  𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡  𝑡ℎ𝑒  𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒  𝑛𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 
 
The expected outcome of how the variable will affect leverage is presented below: 
 
Table 1 – Variables and expected effect on leverage 
Variables Expected effect 
Size Positive 
ROE Negative 
PSR Negative 
Return Negative 
Risk Positive 
REIT Negative 
	  
3.3 Reliability	  and	  validity	  
Reliability and validity are crucial factors in order to establish and assess the quality of the 
research for the qualitative and quantitative researcher (Bryman & Bell, 2008). The reliability 
refers to if the data or measurements are consistent (Hernon & Schwartz, 2009). The validity 
seeks to determine to which extent the findings can be generalized to a population. The REOCs 
and REITs in this study have not been chosen randomly. Instead, they form the index issued by 
EPRA. By using the index, the selection is diversified to different firms and countries. Since the 
methodology relies on historical market information rather than financial statements the thesis 
obtains higher accuracy when comparing firms from different countries. This is because different 
countries use different legislation and fiscal policies. 
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4. Result	  
This chapter is divided into two parts. The first part will present the most relevant findings and 
the second part will describe how the statistics were performed. 
4.1 Findings	  
This chapter present the most relevant result from the regressions. Below in table 
 2 the total statistics is presented. In total, 666 observations are included in the model. The 
leverage for the firms included range between 6.39 % and 80.89 %, with the mean of 44.79 %, 
which indicates a great difference among the choice of capital structure. The variable size is not 
relevant to consider here since it is the logarithm of total asset. The ROE shows wide spread 
between - 91.39 % to + 59.87 %. The PSR also illustrates a large variety between 0.18 and 62.09. 
Furthermore, the variable return and risk also present a large difference, from - 96.19 % to 449.22 
% and 0.01 % and 398.33 % respectively.  
 
Table 2 – Statistics for all firms 
VARIABLES Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Lev 666 44.794 14.081 6.392 80.900 
Size 666 7.819 1.285 3.232 11.690 
ROE 666 6.223 16.485 -91.391 59.867 
PSR 666 6.26 4.860 .182 62.091 
Return 666 7.979 46.183 -96.187 449.221 
Risk 666 38.726 52.737 .014 398.323 
 
Since the dispersion of REITs and REOCs the statistics of these are relevant to examine 
separately. Below, as table 3 illustrates, the maximum leverage of a REIT is 74.99 % and the PSR 
is between 0.48 and 62.09. 
 
Table 3 – Statistics for Real Estate Investment Trusts 
VARIABLES Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Lev 338 41.141 11.604 6.392 74.999 
Size 338 7.605 1.210 3.232 10.291 
ROE 338 7.322 16.420 -91.391 58.235 
PSR 338 7.580 5.024 .480 62.091 
Return 338 4.930 31.530 -77.298 134.610 
Risk 338 35.490 49.092 .0144 324.572 
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Below the statistics for REOCs are presented (Table 4). The maximum leverage is 80.89 % for 
REOCs and the PSR is between 0.18 and 36.79. 
 
Table 4 - Statistics for Real Estate Operating Companies 
VARIABLES Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Lev 328 48.560 15.377 8.722 80.899 
Size 328 8.040 1.324 4.952 11.689 
ROE 328 5.090 16.501 -82.766 59.866 
PSR 328 4.896 4.284 .182 36.791 
Return 328 11.121 57.388 -96.187 449.221 
Risk 328 42.062 56.126 .093 398.329 
 
The correlation between the variables is presented below in table 5. The positive correlations 
have been observed between; leverage and size (0.19) and risk (0.14). The negative correlations 
are between; leverage and ROE (-0.18), PSR (-0.47) and return (-0.07). PSR has the highest 
negative correlation with leverage. The variable size also indicates positive correlation to ROE 
(0.03), return (0.02) and risk (0.14). However, the variable size indicates a negative correlation to 
PSR (-0.17). The variable ROE shows positive correlation to PSR (0.26) and return (0.14) but 
negative correlation to risk (-0.10). The variable PSR indicate positive correlation to return (0.14) 
but negative to risk (-0.20). The variables return and risk are positive correlated (0.20). 
 
Table 5 - Correlation between the variables 
  Lev Size ROE PSR Ret Risk 
Lev 1.000 	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
Size 0.198 1.000 	   	   	   	  ROE -0.183 0.030 1.000 	   	   	  PSR -0.471 -0.173 0.259 1.000 	   	  Return -0.074 0.019 0.370 0.143 1.000 	  Risk 0.143 0.045 -0.101 -0.202 0.195 1.000 
 
In table 6 below, the three models REOC for fixed effect, REOC for robust effect and REIT for 
random effect is presented. In the first model; REOC for fixed effect, only two of the variables 
are significant i.e. PSR and Size. However, six out of nine dummy variables are still significant. 
In the second model; REOC for robust, only PSR is significant of the independent variables and 
none of the dummy variables are significant. In the third model; REIT for random effect, ROE 
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and PSR are significant but none of the dummy variables. The R-squared are 0.223, 0.223 and 
0.306 for the first, second and third model respectively.  
 
Table 6 - Summarized models of table 9 and 10 
 REOC  Fixed REOC Robust REIT Random  
VARIABLES Lev Lev Lev  
     
Size 3.353** 3.353 1.065  
 (1.346) (2.828) (0.987)  
ROE -0.051 -0.051 -0.097***  
 (0.033) (0.040) (0.029)  
PSR -0.501*** -0.501** -0.492***  
 (0.137) (0.228) (0.100)  
Return -0.010 -0.010 -0.017  
 (0.012) (0.011) (0.021)  
Risk 0.000 0.000 0.046**  
 (0.015) (0.014) (0.022)  
Year2004 -0.722 -0.722 -0.551  
 (1.958) (2.198) (1.664)  
Year2005 -2.874 -2.874 -1.324  
 (1.953) (2.458) (1.828)  
Year2006 -6.434*** -6.434* -0.063  
 (2.160) (3.474) (1.875)  
Year2007 -6.341*** -6.341* -2.436  
 (2.125) (3.423) (1.955)  
Year2008 -3.756* -3.756 0.163  
 (2.223) (3.217) (1.916)  
Year2009 -4.727** -4.727 -1.059  
 (2.374) (3.451) (2.083)  
Year2010 -4.785** -4.785 2.730  
 (2.164) (3.557) (1.767)  
Year2011 -5.915*** -5.915* 2.301  
 (2.136) (3.479) (1.717)  
Year2012 -7.262*** -7.262* 0.375  
 (2.198) (3.826) (1.858)  
Constant 29.04*** 29.04 34.05***  
 (10.21) (21.12) (7.472)  
     
Observations 328 328 338  
Number of firms 41 41 43  
R-squared 0.223 0.223 0.306  
1. Standard errors in parentheses 
2. Significant level at *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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4.2 Descriptive	  statistics	  
To be able to fulfil the purpose of the thesis a quantitative method is used. Panel data allows for 
control of variables that varies over time and across companies. Panel data has to approach either 
the fixed effect or the random effect. The fixed effect model does not allow for variables that do 
not vary over time. However, the random effect model does consider not time-vary variables. 
Furthermore, a Hausman test decides whether one should use a fixed effect or a random effect. 
Basically, a Hausman test will test if the unique errors are correlated with the regressors. 
 
The independent variables are at first controlled individually. This is done through a simple 
regression model for each variable in order to confirm the significance of each variable. As a 
result, see below in table 7, the variables are all highly significant and therefore relevant to test in 
a multiple regression analysis.  
 
Table 7 - Test of the variables individually 
      
VARIABLES Leverage Leverage Leverage Leverage Leverage 
      
Size 2.911***     
 (0.715)     
ROE  -0.144***    
  (0.017)    
PSR   -0.711***   
   (0.071)   
Return    -0.031***  
    (0.006)  
Risk     0.018** 
     (0.009) 
Constant 22.04*** 45.69*** 49.24*** 45.04*** 42.98*** 
 (5.600) (0.278) (0.509) (0.270) (1.571) 
      
Observations 666 666 666 666 666 
R-squared 0.028 0.108 0.148 0.045 0.004 
Number of firms 84 84 84 84 84 
1. Standard errors are presented in parentheses 
2. Significant level at *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Since, panel data is used one should decide whether fixed effect or random effect are appropriate. 
Regressions for fixed effect and random effect are shown in table 8. The model for this regression 
will be:  
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𝐿𝐸𝑉𝐸𝑅𝐴𝐺𝐸!,! = α+   𝛽! ∗ 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒! + 𝛽! ∗ 𝑅𝑂𝐸! +     𝛽! ∗ 𝑃𝑆𝑅! +   𝛽! ∗ 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛! +   𝛽! ∗ 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘! + 𝛽!∗ 𝑅𝑒𝑖𝑡! + 𝛽! ∗ 𝐷!!"!!! + 𝑒!,! 
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Table 8 - Regressions and hausman test 
	   	   	   	   	   	  
	  
  Fixed effect Random effect 
	  
	  
VARIABLES Lev Lev 
	  
	  
Size 2.034** 1.501** 
	  
	  
 (0.958) (0.687) 
	  
	  
ROE -0.074*** -0.067*** 
	  
	  
 (0.022) (0.022) 
	  
	  
PSR -0.437*** -0.507*** 
	  
	  
 (0.082) (0.079) 
	  
	  
Return -0.019* -0.020** 
	  
	  
 (0.010) (0.009) 
	  
	  
Risk 0.010 0.013 
	  
	  
 (0.012) (0.011) 
	  
	  
REIT - -6.575*** 
	  
	  
 - (2.411) 
	  
	  
Year2004 -0.321 -0.240 
	  
	  
 (1.263) (1.287) 
	  
	  
Year2005 -1.413 -1.183 
	  
	  
 (1.296) (1.307) 
	  
	  
Year2006 -2.912** -2.420* 
	  
	  
 (1.448) (1.409) 
	  
	  
Year2007 -3.269** -2.861** 
	  
	  
 (1.415) (1.359) 
	  
	  
Year2008 -0.954 -0.568 
	  
	  
 (1.492) (1.426) 
	  
	  
Year2009 -2.153 -1.990 
	  
	  
 (1.610) (1.523) 
	  
	  
Year2010 -0.080 0.277 
	  
	  
 (1.415) (1.348) 
	  
	  
Year2011 -1.118 -0.727 
	  
	  
 (1.405) (1.322) 
	  
	  
Year2012 -2.472* -2.310* 
	  
	  
 (1.485) (1.372) 
	  
	  
Constant 33.37*** 39.84*** 
	  
	  
 (7.172) (5.586) 
	  
	  
Observations 666 666 
	  
	  
Number of firms 84 84 
	  
	  
R-squared 0.227 0.226 
	  
	  
1. Standard errors in parantheses 
	  
	  
2. Significant level at *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1***  
	  
	  
Hausman test: Chi2 = 408.01 Prob>chi2 = 0.000 
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  The Hausman test in table 8 indicates that the null hypothesis is possible to reject. When the null 
hypothesis can be rejected the fixed effect should be used. Fixed effect does only consider 
variables that do vary over time. As a result, this approach is not relevant to use in this case due 
to the dummy variable for REIT.  
 
Therefore the sample has been divided into two new samples. The first sample consists of REITs 
and the other one of REOCs. Based on the two samples two new regressions where conducted. 
Now, the dummy variable for REITs is excluded. The model for these two regressions will look 
like: 
 𝐿𝐸𝑉𝐸𝑅𝐴𝐺𝐸!,! = α+   𝛽! ∗ 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒! + 𝛽! ∗ 𝑅𝑂𝐸! +     𝛽! ∗ 𝑃𝑆𝑅! +   𝛽! ∗ 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛! +   𝛽! ∗ 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘!
+ 𝛽! ∗ 𝐷!!"!!! + 𝑒!,! 
 
The regressions, based on fixed effect and random effect for REITs, are presented in table 9. The 
Hausman test for REITs indicates that random effect is the proper model to use. 
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Table 9 - Regressions for the REIT sample 
	   	   	   	   	   	  
	  
  REIT Fixed effect 
REIT Random 
effect 
	  
	  
VARIABLES Lev Lev 
	  
	  
Size 1.691 1.065 
	  
	  
 (1.430) (0.987) 
	  
	  
ROE -0.087*** -0.097*** 
	  
	  
 (0.0285) (0.029) 
	  
	  
PSR -0.432*** -0.492*** 
	  
	  
 (0.108) (0.100) 
	  
	  
Return -0.024 -0.017 
	  
	  
 (0.0211) (0.021) 
	  
	  
Risk 0.066** 0.046** 
	  
	  
 (0.027) (0.022) 
	  
	  
Year2004 -0.670 -0.551 
	  
	  
 (1.630) (1.664) 
	  
	  
Year2005 -1.847 -1.324 
	  
	  
 (1.833) (1.828) 
	  
	  
Year2006 -0.652 -0.063 
	  
	  
 (1.944) (1.875) 
	  
	  
Year2007 -3.145 -2.436 
	  
	  
 (2.038) (1.955) 
	  
	  
Year2008 -0.422 0.163 
	  
	  
 (2.044) (1.916) 
	  
	  
Year2009 -2.302 -1.059 
	  
	  
 (2.288) (2.083) 
	  
	  
Year2010 2.175 2.730 
	  
	  
 (1.876) (1.767) 
	  
	  
Year2011 2.108 2.301 
	  
	  
 (1.860) (1.717) 
	  
	  
Year2012 0.110 0.375 
	  
	  
 (2.074) (1.858) 
	  
	  
Constant 30.35*** 34.05*** 
	  
	  
 (10.54) (7.472) 
	  
	  
Observations 338 338 
	  
	  
Number of firms 43 43 
	  
	  
R-squared 0.309 0.306 
	  
	  
1. Standard errors in parantheses 
	  
	  
2. Significant level at *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1***  
	  
	  
Hausman test: Chi2 = 22.79 Prob>chi2 = 0.0638 
	  
	  
Breusch and Pagan test: Chibar2 =363.61 Prob>chibar2=0.000	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  Further, a Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test for random effects is conducted to 
ensure that random effect is the correct test to perform and not the one least square (OLS) 
estimator. Since it is possible to reject the null hypothesis the Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian 
multiplier test for random effects table 9 indicate that random effect is the most relevant 
estimator.  
 
The regressions on fixed effect and random effect for REOCs are shown in table 10. In this case 
the Hausman test implies that fixed effect should be used. Since, fixed effect is the proper model, 
a Breusch and Pagan test for heteroscedasticity is conducted in order to decide whether 
heteroscedasticity has to be taken into consideration. However, the Breusch and Pagan test 
indicates that it is possible to reject the null hypothesis, which implies heteroscedasticity in the 
model. To correct for heteroscedasticity a robust regression is conducted, presented in table 10 
together with the fixed and random effect model.  
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Table 10 – Regressions for the REOC sample 
	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
	  
  REOC Fixed REOC robust REOC random 
	  
	  
VARIABLES Lev Lev Lev 
	  
	  
Size 3.353** 3.353 2.446** 
	  
	  
 
	  
(1.346) (2.828) (0.983) 
	  
	  
ROE -0.051 -0.051 -0.033 
	  
	  
 
	  
(0.033) (0.040) (0.033) 
	  
	  
PSR -0.501*** -0.501** -0.604*** 
	  
	  
 
	  
(0.137) (0.228) (0.136) 
	  
	  
Return -0.010 -0.010 -0.013 
	  
	  
 
	  
(0.012) (0.011) (0.012) 
	  
	  
Risk 0.000 0.000 0.005 
	  
	  
 
	  
(0.015) (0.014) (0.014) 
	  
	  
Year2004 -0.722 -0.722 -0.476 
	  
	  
 
	  
(1.958) (2.198) (2.002) 
	  
	  
Year2005 -2.874 -2.874 -2.377 
	  
	  
 
	  
(1.953) (2.458) (1.988) 
	  
	  
Year2006 -6.434*** -6.434* -5.479** 
	  
	  
 
	  
(2.160) (3.474) (2.133) 
	  
	  
Year2007 -6.341*** -6.341* -5.418*** 
	  
	  
 
	  
(2.125) (3.423) (2.066) 
	  
	  
Year2008 -3.756* -3.756 -2.840 
	  
	  
 
	  
(2.223) (3.217) (2.152) 
	  
	  
Year2009 -4.727** -4.727 -4.288* 
	  
	  
 
	  
(2.374) (3.451) (2.293) 
	  
	  
Year2010 -4.785** -4.785 -3.927* 
	  
	  
 
	  
(2.164) (3.557) (2.085) 
	  
	  
Year2011 -5.915*** -5.915* -4.971** 
	  
	  
 
	  
(2.136) (3.479) (2.033) 
	  
	  
Year2012 -7.262*** -7.262* -6.433*** 
	  
	  
 
	  
(2.198) (3.826) (2.069) 
	  
	  
Constant 29.04*** 29.04 35.61*** 
	  
	  
 
	  
(10.21) (21.12) (7.773) 
	  
	  
Observations 328 328 328 
	  
	  
Number of firms 41 41 41 
	  
	  
R-squared 0.223 0.223 0.219 
	  
 
1. Standard errors in parantheses 
	  
 
2. Significant level at *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1***  
	  
 
Hausman test: Chi2 = 408.01 Prob>chi2 = 0.000 
	  
 
Test for Heteroskedasticity: Chi2 = 3138.12 Prob>chi2 = 0.000 
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5. Analysis	  	  
In this chapter the presented result will be analysed. The first part will focus on analysing the 
tables of the firm statistics. Furthermore, the correlations between variables with emphasize on 
leverage will be analysed. The three different models; Real Estate Operation Companies, fixed 
effect model, Real Estate Operating Companies, robust fixed effect model and Real Estate 
Investment Trusts, random effect model will be analysed. Insignificant variables will not be 
considered because these seem irrelevant.  
 
Statistics 
 
The mean leverage differ between REITs (41.14%) and REOCs (48.56%), which can be seen in 
table 3 and 4. Consequently, the overall average for leverage is 44.79 %, which can be seen in 
table 2. Hence, REOCs tend to employ more debt compared to REITs. In contrast, the mean ROE 
for REITs (7.32%) has been higher compared to ROE for REOCs (5.09%). This means that the 
return on the shareholder equity in average has been higher for REITs then to REOCs.  
 
The average PSR for REITs (7.58) and REOCs (4.90) differ and tells that investors have valued 
REITs higher than REOCs. This could be due to a greater diversification REITs are able to 
achieve compared to REOCs. REOCs are mainly concentrated to certain areas or countries 
whereas REITs have the possibility to divers investments over several countries and areas. 
Moreover, another reason could be due to high interest expenses that affect the result and 
consequently the stock return of REOCs. 
 
The average stock return for REITs (4.93%) and REOCs (11.12%) also indicates a great 
difference of how investors perceive the firms. The standard deviation of return for REITs 
(31.53%) and REOCs (57.39%) tells that the volatility of the stock return has been greater for 
REOCs then for REITs.  
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Correlation 
 
The correlation table (Table 5) indicates a positive correlation between leverage and size and risk. 
The positive risk correlation seems highly reasonable since increased amount of debt will 
increase the leverage. Surprisingly, the strongest positive correlation is between leverage and 
size. One reason could be because larger firms employ more debt due to better terms and 
conditions compared to smaller firms.  
 
The correlation between leverage and ROE, PSR and return is negative. PSR has the highest 
negative correlation with leverage. One explanation is that a profitable firm could choose to pay 
off its liabilities. The market would value a less risky asset higher. The increased value of the 
asset would affect the price to sales ratio positive. This argument could be the same for ROE, 
which also has negative correlation to leverage. The correlation between return and leverage is 
also negative which seems perfectly reasonable since the risk increases when debt is employed to 
a firm.   
 
Real Estate Operation Companies, fixed effect model 
 
The variable PSR is significant and has a negative effect (-0.50) on leverage (Table 6). It means 
that if the price to sales ratio increases i.e. price per stock increases or sales per stock decreases, 
then the PSR would increase and decrease the leverage. This seams reasonable since the market 
value less leverage firms higher since it implies less risk for investors. The rest of the variables; 
ROE, return and risk are not significant.  
 
Six of the nine year dummies show significance for the REOC fixed effect model; Year2006 (-
6.43), Year2007 (-6.34), Year2009 (-4.73), Year2010 (-4.79), Year2011 (-5.92) and Year2012 (-
7.26). The dummies for year 2006 and 2007 indicate the most negative impact on leverage except 
for year 2012. Due to the overall boom market in 2006 and 2007 before the financial crises, is 
could be interpreted as that the total assets increased in value over this time. Since a boom 
increase value of assets the level of leverage decrease. Hence, the booked value increased. The 
overall trend for the firms indicate a negative trend of leverage compared to the base year 2003 
which means this year dummy is omitted in the regression.  
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From the result it is possible to reject the following null-hypotheses for the fixed effect model: 
 
Size (total assets) 
 𝐻!!"#$ = 𝑇ℎ𝑒  𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒  𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒  𝑑𝑜𝑒𝑠  𝑛𝑜𝑡  𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡  𝑡ℎ𝑒  𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒  𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒   𝐻!!"#$ = 𝑇ℎ𝑒  𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒  𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒  𝑑𝑜𝑒𝑠  𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡  𝑡ℎ𝑒  𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒  𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒   
 
Price to sales ratio (PSR) 
 𝐻!!"# = 𝑇ℎ𝑒  𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒  𝑃𝑆𝑅  𝑑𝑜𝑒𝑠  𝑛𝑜𝑡  𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡  𝑡ℎ𝑒  𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒  𝑛𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝐻!!"# = 𝑇ℎ𝑒  𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒  𝑃𝑆𝑇  𝑑𝑜𝑒𝑠  𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡  𝑡ℎ𝑒  𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒  𝑛𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 
 
Real Estate Operating Companies, robust fixed effect model 
 
The robust fixed effect model for REOCs resulted in one significant variable (Table 6); PSR (-
0.50). Hence, PSR gave the same result in this model as in the fixed effect model. The R-square 
(0.223) for this model indicates that the variables included explain the model to 22.3 %. 
 
From the result it is possible to reject the following null-hypotheses for the robust fixed effect 
model: 
 
Price to sales ratio (PSR) 
 𝐻!!"# = 𝑇ℎ𝑒  𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒  𝑃𝑆𝑅  𝑑𝑜𝑒𝑠  𝑛𝑜𝑡  𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡  𝑡ℎ𝑒  𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒  𝑛𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝐻!!"# = 𝑇ℎ𝑒  𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒  𝑃𝑆𝑇  𝑑𝑜𝑒𝑠  𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡  𝑡ℎ𝑒  𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒  𝑛𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 
 
 
Real Estate Investment Trusts, random effect model 
 
The random effect model (Table 6) resulted in three significant variables; ROE (-0.10), PSR (-
0.49) and Risk (0.05). Hence, none of the dummies were significant. The R-square for the 
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random effect model is 0.31. Thus, the variables explain this model better compared to the two 
previous. From the result it is possible to reject the following null-hypotheses for the random 
effect model: 
 
 
Return on common equity (ROE) 𝐻!!"# = 𝑇ℎ𝑒  𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒  𝑅𝑂𝐸  𝑑𝑜𝑒𝑠  𝑛𝑜𝑡  𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡  𝑡ℎ𝑒  𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒  𝑛𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒   𝐻!!"# = 𝑇ℎ𝑒  𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒  𝑅𝑂𝐸  𝑑𝑜𝑒𝑠  𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡  𝑡ℎ𝑒  𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒  𝑛𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 
 
Price to sales ratio (PSR) 
 𝐻!!"# = 𝑇ℎ𝑒  𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒  𝑃𝑆𝑅  𝑑𝑜𝑒𝑠  𝑛𝑜𝑡  𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡  𝑡ℎ𝑒  𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒  𝑛𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝐻!!"# = 𝑇ℎ𝑒  𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒  𝑃𝑆𝑇  𝑑𝑜𝑒𝑠  𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡  𝑡ℎ𝑒  𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒  𝑛𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 
 
Risk 𝐻!!"#$ = 𝑇ℎ𝑒  𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒  𝑅𝐸𝑇  𝑑𝑜𝑒𝑠  𝑛𝑜𝑡  𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡  𝑡ℎ𝑒  𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒  𝑛𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝐻!!"#$ = 𝑇ℎ𝑒  𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒  𝑅𝐸𝑇  𝑑𝑜𝑒𝑠  𝑛𝑜𝑡  𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡  𝑡ℎ𝑒  𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒  𝑛𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 
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6. Discussion	  	  
This study has investigated what factors that affect the capital structure of 84 real estate firms 
within Europe, both REITs and REOCs. Due to high level of leverage the real estate sector is 
greatly influenced by the capital markets. Real estate firms have large amount of collateral, i.e. 
the actual properties, which is used to support high levels of debt. From the trade-off perspective, 
this means that the costs of financial distress or costs are probably lower. 
 
Morri and Cristianziani (2009) argue that according to both the trade off theory and the pecking 
order theory size is a good explanatory variable for leverage. In addition, the trade off theory 
clarify that a larger firm tend to be more diversify and therefore have more stable cash flow than 
minor firms and thus can easier raise debt. Subsequently, larger firms are more likely to have 
increase leverage. However, the pecking order theory claims that a greater firm have higher 
number of analysis and therefore are more intensively analysed by investors and stakeholders. 
Consequently the pecking order theory states that leverage is greater for minor firms (Morri & 
Cristanziani, 2009). Since the result of size is not significant for robust fixed effect or random 
effect it is not possible to argue weather for or against any of the theories. Nevertheless, in the 
regressions for REIT and REOC size approach a positive value, which might indicate that the 
trade off theory is proper on the relation for leverage and size. However, size is significant for the 
fixed effect for REOC. Also Morri and Cristianziani (2009) argue for a positive effect of size on 
leverage. Hence, the result is in line with the expected result. 
 
The pecking order theory also says that firms’ dividend policy is sticky according to Myers and 
Majluf (1984). It means that the firm tries to retain a constant dividend to keep the share price 
stable over time. Hence, if a firm increase sales and profit, the company could choose to pay off 
debt. The variable price to sales ratio (PSR) is significant for all three models and indicates a 
negative impact on leverage. This is in accordance to the expected results. The return on equity 
(ROE) could be interpreted the same way. The ROE also shows a negative impact on leverage, 
although the effect is not as large as for PSR. However, ROE is only significant for the REITs 
model.   
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7. Conclusion	  
This chapter identify the most relevant findings in order to answer the thesis research questions. 
Since all the independent variables are individually significant the authors argue that they all 
have more or less impact on leverage. Return on equity (ROE), price to sales (PSR) and risk 
affect the capital structure of REITs the most. Since robust fixed effect is used for REOCs, PSR 
is the only significant and one could claim it has the most impact on leverage. The correlation 
between leverage and PSR also indicates the strongest negative relationship. The fixed effect 
model for REOCs without consideration for heteroscedasticity shows that size also has a 
significant impact on leverage.  
 
Over time it is possible to argue that leverage has exhibit a negative change since 2003. For 
REOCs, in the fixed effect model, six out of nine dummies are significant. However, the year 
dummies are not significant for the two other models; REOCs in the robust fixed effect model or 
REITs in the random model.  
 
Other main findings can be summarised as follow: 
• This thesis has shown that REOCs have in average more leverage than REITs (41.14% vs 
48.56%) 
• The variable size has a positive coefficient to leverage for the REOCs fixed effect model. 
It is also shown by the correlation between leverage and size. Thus, it is in line with the 
trade off model. 
• The variable ROE has a negative coefficient to leverage for REITs in the random model. 
Thus, the measure for profit is in line with the pecking order theory. 
 
In order to fully understand the drivers behind the capital structure one should need to include 
more variables. The authors argue that a variable such as stock price to booked value could be 
included to capture the growth rate of a firm. Furthermore, it would be relevant to include 
variables that capture macro economic affects. This variable could for example be a large stock 
index or a weighted inflation rate for the European countries.   
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Appendix	  	  
Country Company   
   Belgium Befimmo (Sicafi) REIT 
 
Cofinimmo REIT 
 
Wereldhave Belgium REIT 
 
Intervest Offices & Warehouses REIT 
 
Warehouses De Pauw REIT 
 
Leasinvest-Sicafi REIT 
   Czech Republic Orco Property Group S.A. Exluded 
   Finland Citycon REOC 
 
Sponda  Oyj REOC 
 
Technopolis REOC 
   France Silic REIT 
 
Mercialys REIT 
 
Icade REIT 
 
ANF-Immobilier S.A. REIT 
 
Fonciere Des Regions REIT 
 
Gecina REIT 
 
Affine REIT 
 
Societe de la Tour Eiffel REIT 
 
Klepierre REIT 
 
Unibail - Rodamco REIT 
   Germany GSW Immobilien AG Exluded 
 
Prime Office REIT-AG Exluded 
 
Patrizia Immobilien REOC 
 
DIC Asset AG REOC 
 
Gagfah REOC 
 
Alstria Office REIT 
 
Ivg Immobilien REOC 
 
Colonia Real Estate REOC 
 
Deutsche EuroShop REOC 
 
Hamborner REIT AG REIT 
 
TAG Immobilien AG REOC 
 
Deutsche Wohnen AG REOC 
   Greece Eurobank Properties Real Estate Investment Co Exluded 
   Italy Beni Stabili REIT 
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Igd - Immobiliare Grande Distribuzione REIT 
   Netherland EuroCommercial Ppty REIT 
 
Vastned Retail REIT 
 
Corio REIT 
 
Wereldhave Exluded 
 
Nieuwe Steen Inv REIT 
   Norwegian Norwegian Property ASA REOC 
   Austria Ca Immobilien REOC 
 
Conwert Immobilien Invest REOC 
   Poland LC Corp SA REOC 
 
Atrium European Real Estate REOC 
 
Globe Trade Centre REOC 
   Russia PIK Group REOC 
 
Immofinanz AG REOC 
   Sweden Wihlborgs Fastigheter REOC 
 
Hufvudstaden A REOC 
 
Castellum REOC 
 
FABEGE REOC 
 
Kungsleden REOC 
 
Wallenstam AB REOC 
 
Fastighets AB Balder B REOC 
 
Klovern AB REOC 
   Switzerland Mobimo REOC 
 
PSP Swiss Property REOC 
 
Allreal Hld N REOC 
 
Swiss Prime Site REOC 
   Turkey Akmerkez Gayrimenkul Yatirim REIT 
 
Torunlar Gayrimenkul Yatirim Ortakligi REIT 
 
Emlak Konut Gayrimenkul Yatirim Ortakligi AS REIT 
 
Akfen Gayrimenkul Yatirim Ortakligi AS Exluded 
 
Sinpas Gayrimenkul Yatirim Ortakligi REIT 
 
Alarko G.Yat.Ort Exluded 
 
Is Gayrimenkul Yatirim Ortak REIT 
   United Kingdom British Land Co REIT 
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Daejan Hdg ROEC 
 
Great Portland Estates REIT 
 
Land Securities Group REIT 
 
Segro REIT 
 
Picton Property Income Exluded 
 
Hansteen Holdings REIT 
 
Hammerson REIT 
 
London & Stamford Property REIT 
 
Capital & Counties Properties REOC 
 
UK Commercial Property Trust Exluded 
 
Safestore Holdings REOC 
 
Primary Health Prop. REIT 
 
Capital Shopping Centres Group REIT 
 
Derwent London REIT 
 
Shaftesbury REIT 
 
Mucklow (A.& J.)Group REIT 
 
Quintain Estates and Development REOC 
 
Helical Bar REOC 
 
St.Modwen Properties PLC REOC 
 
Grainger REOC 
 
Workspace Group REIT 
 
Development Securities REOC 
 
Unite Group REOC 
 
Big Yellow Group REIT 
 
Standard Life Inv Prop Inc Trust Exluded 
 
IRP Property Investments Exluded 
 
Schroder Real Estate Investment Trust REOC 
 
F&C Commercial Property Trust Exluded 
 
 
 
 
